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This paper considers aspects of the judicialization of health care policy in Brazil. It discusses
the  issue in the context of the separation of the powers of government, judicial protection
of  the public right to healthcare, the so-called “technical administrative discretionary pre-
rogatives,” and ﬁnally, the need for a budget to provide for the efﬁcacy of court decisions.
To  further the analysis of Brazil’s treatment of the judicialization of politics this paper also
compares Brazil’s experience with the experience of other countries witnessing the same
phenomenon.
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In Brazil, the topic of the “judicialization of healthcare pol-
cy” continues fomenting debates in the three branches of
ower and naturally provokes interest of judges’ academies
nd schools.1,a The recent National Council of Justice (CNJ)
ecommendation no. 31, of 30 March 2010, on healthcare
ssistance, and CNJ Resolution no. 107, of 6 April 2010, that
stablishes the National Judiciary Forum for the monitoring
nd settlement of healthcare assistance claims is clear evi-
ence of the importance and timeliness of the subject in
razilian society.2,b The current signiﬁcance of the topic of
udicialization of healthcare policy is manifested in the joint
cademic pursuit undertaken by the Fluminense Federal Uni-
ersity, Judiciary Sciences Centre, Nupej, and University of
aris Descartes, Institute of Health and Law, IDS, and the
ational Health School of the Universidade Nova (New Univer-
ity) of Lisbon. Federal Senate Bill no. 338, of 2007, further
vidences the primacy of the topic by amending law no.
.80/1990 that deals with the supply of therapeutic procedures
nd distribution of medication by the Sistema Único de Saúde
Single Healthcare System).3,c
a Stating “people speak of the ‘judicialization of healthcare pol-
cy,’  as though referring to a distortion that needs to be combated
ike  an epidemic of judicial actions, whereas the constant observa-
ion  of reality, according to the essential methodological attitude in
ny scientiﬁc ﬁeld shows exactly the opposite to be true. In many
ases, calling upon the judiciary is the only efﬁcacious remedy
hat  is actually available to society for confronting certain dys-
unctions and insufﬁciencies of the system. These insufﬁciencies
nd dysfunctions are derived from, and this is the real cause to be
liminated, the lack of clear rules concerning the rights and obli-
ations of each of the participants, as well as their responsibilities
nd limitations.”). Brazil is a federal republic made up of federal,
tate, and municipal levels of governance.
b Holding healthcare study and mobilization seminars, bring-
ng together judges, members of the public prosecutor’s ofﬁce
nd managers, in order to promote better networking in the sub-
ect area, with the objective of obtaining technical support from
edical doctors and pharmacologists to help the judges form a
udgment of high quality in terms of their evaluation of the clin-
cal  questions presented by the litigants; promoting visits by the
udges to the State and Municipal Healthcare Councils, to pub-
ic  healthcare units and the accredited units of the SUS (Single
ealthcare System) in order to gain practical knowledge of how
hey  work).
c Proposing speciﬁc normative measures aimed at optimizing
rocedural routines, organizing and structuring specialized
udicial units, and normative measures to prevent judicial
onﬂicts and to deﬁne strategies in healthcare law, includ-
ng legislation on healthcare as an independent subject in
he Administrative Justice program for the corresponding
udges’ entrance exam, in accordance with the list of mini-
um  required subjects established by CNJ by-law no 650/2009 –
ttp://www.cnj.jus.br/atos-administrativos/11896:portaria-n-650-
e-20-de-novembro-de-2009; Senate Bill no. 338/2007 – http://
ww.senado.gov.br/atividade/materia/detalhes.asp?p cod mate
81517; Law 12.401 of 2011; Senate Bill no. 338 of 2007 – http://www.
lanalto.gov.br/ccivil 03/ Ato2011-2014/2011/Lei/L12401.htm;
tating “the importance of the subject matter of this
eport and the need to ﬁnd solutions that safeguard the right to
niversal and egalitarian access to actions and services for health
romotion, protection and recovery”, as stipulated by Article 196
f  the Federal Constitution, led the healthcare managers, the
udiciary Power, the Public Prosecutor’s Ofﬁce and representative 0 1 4;3 2(2):134–143 135
The judicialization of healthcare policy is not unique to
Brazil. It is also found in a limited degree in the United States
and to the same extent as in Brazil in other Latin American
countries such as Uruguay, Argentina, Chile, Paraguay, Colom-
bia, Ecuador, Venezuela, Bolivia, Peru and Mexico.4,d
Strictly on the procedural level, the expression “judicial-
ization of healthcare policy” is present whenever Government
acts or omissions give rise to legal action, brought against a
public healthcare authority regarding healthcare policy, that
asserts the right to protection of healthcare in light of uncon-
stitutionality or violation of current legislation.5,6,e
A typical example of the judicialization of healthcare policy
in Brazilian courts arises when actions are ﬁled, individually
or collectively, against a Public Healthcare Authority for the
supply of medicines not incorporated into the SUS. In fact,
although the SUS is a universal, egalitarian, free and compre-
hensive system, certain medical treatments and products may
not be made available to the general public. This lack of avail-
ability can be attributed generally to either of the following
two situations: (1) the lack of public healthcare policies (laws,
rules or administrative proceedings) that support or coincide
segments of civil society to promote (in recent years) various
debates about the increased role of the judiciary in examining
public healthcare policies. In April 2009, the Federal Supreme
Court held a Public Hearing in order to prepare an assessment of
the  actions subject to its judgment, in which 5 out 6 of the planned
topics were directly related to the ‘judicialization of healthcare
policy’ in the context of the single healthcare system (SUS).
d Discussing increased litigation over termination of
health beneﬁts since Goldberg v. Kelly); Chile Constitutional
Court Judgment No. 976-07 of 2008; Colombia Constitu-
tional Court Judgment no. T-760 of 2008 – http://www.
corteconstitucional.gov.co/relatoria/2008/T-760-08.htm; Buenos
Aires National Supreme Court, Recurso de Hecho Law B. 537. XLIV
2010; Uruguay Court of Appeals in Civil Matters, 2nd Judicial Rota-
tion,  Judgment no. 159/2008; Uruguay Court for Administrative
Litigation, 3rd Judicial Rotation, Action for Amparo (constitutional
relief) IUE 2-27081/2009; Uruguay Court of Appeals in Civil Matters,
5th  Judicial Rotation, Judgment no. 94/2012.
e Inferring healthcare is considered a subjective public right
from language that states, “everyone is entitled to health-
care, which is a duty of the State, guaranteed by social and
economic policies intended to reduce the risk of illness and
other grievances and to ensure universal and egalitarian access
to  actions and services for health promotion, protection and
recovery.”); Brazil Federal Supreme Court, STA 175 AgR/CE,
DJ-e 76, p. 70, 30 April 2010; German Federal Constitutional
Court. Guiding Principle of the Decision of the First Senate
(Leitsatz zum Beschluss des Ersten Senats), 1 BvR 347/98 of
2005 – http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/entscheidungen/
rs20051206 1bvr034798.html. It should be noted that judicial
review by the Supreme Federal Tribunal (STF) occurs on both a
diffuse and abstract basis. Much like the United States’ system
of diffuse review, lower courts of general jurisdiction can deal
with constitutional questions while the STF exercises appellate
jurisdiction over these concrete cases and controversies. Addition-
ally, direct actions challenging constitutionality in the abstract (i.e.
without a speciﬁc cases or controversy) can be brought by a certain
government and non-governmental individuals and entities spec-
iﬁed by the Constitution. The exercise of abstract review requires
a  quorum of eight (of eleven) justices, and six votes are required to
declare an act unconstitutional. Decisions in direct action abstract
review are binding erga omnes.
b l i c a136  r e v p o r t s a ú d e p ú 
with the patient’s claims; or (2) the Public Healthcare Author-
ity’s failure to comply with the existing policies, often due
to the lack of a clear deﬁnition of the division of authority
among federal entities. Strictly speaking, the judicialization of
healthcare policy is found only in the ﬁrst situation, in which
healthcare policies are lacking and the existing policies some-
how frustrate the citizens’ demands for medication necessary
to protect their health.f
To ensure adequate examination of the procedural aspects
of the judicialization of healthcare policy, especially from a
comparative perspective, this study will be limited to court
cases related to healthcare policies established by adminis-
trative acts or rules. That is to say, this study will focus on
procedural law in cases relevant to public healthcare authori-
ties, known in Brazil as “public procedural law”, in the United
States as a subset of administrative law concerned with
“administrative procedure,” and in Europe and the rest of Latin
America as “administrative jurisdiction” or “administrative
justice.”7,8 The scope of this analysis does not include judi-
cial protection extended to healthcare policies derived directly
from law, since such protection depends more  on the prin-
ciples of constitutional jurisdiction. Additionally, and most
importantly, this study will not focus on judicial protection
derived directly from law because the majority of the litigation
over public healthcare rights in Brazil do not involve ques-
tions of constitutionality – whether by act or omission – of
healthcare laws.g
f Brazil Federal Supreme Court, STA 175, 17 Mar. 2010; Public
Hearing 4 (judicial disputes on the subject of “healthcare law”
mainly arise from the public healthcare authority SUS deny-
ing  a request because the requested medicine is not registered,
an administrative decision of the National Health Surveillance
Agency (Anvisa) refusing to register a healthcare product (includ-
ing  drugs that are purely experimental or whose efﬁcacy have
not  been demonstrated scientiﬁcally). The SUS failing to regularly
provide the healthcare action (medicine or treatment) even though
it is registered with Anvisa: (a) administrative decision based on
the  lack of scientiﬁc evidence for the requested healthcare treat-
ment or product – an alternative treatment is proposed (but not
found suitable by the claimant); (b) decision based on the lack
of  scientiﬁc evidence for the requested healthcare treatment or
product – without any speciﬁc treatment for the claimant’s pathol-
ogy;  (c) administrative decision justifying treatment based on new
healthcare products or treatments – not tested by the SUS (not
included in the test protocols); 3. The public healthcare authority
SUS  regularly supplies the healthcare product (requested medicine
or  treatment), but in a certain speciﬁc case rightly denies the
claimant’s request: administrative decision based on the unsuit-
ability of the healthcare product or treatment for the claimant.
g Public Hearing 4, initiated by the Federal Supreme Court in STA
175; stating “after hearing the testimony of the representatives of
the various sectors involved, I think it is necessary to rethink the
question of the ‘judicialization’ of healthcare law in Brazil. This
is  so because in the majority of cases judicial intervention is not
motivated by an absolute omission in the public healthcare poli-
cies intended to safeguard the right to healthcare but rather by the
need for a judicial determination for the enforcement of policies
that already exist. Thus, there is no problem of judicial interfer-
ence with the free evaluations or margin of discretion enjoyed by
the  other branches of government with respect to the formulation
of  public policies. That fact may be relevant when establishing a
criterion or parameter to decide cases like this one, in which the . 2 0 1 4;3 2(2):134–143
Is it necessary to require speciﬁc judicial protection for the
public right to healthcare protection? Is there a need for spe-
cialized public healthcare courts and procedural rules based
on the German model with its social law jurisdiction and pro-
cedural legislation?9–11,h Is it not enough to have the existing
courts and procedural rules applicable to public disputes in
general, as is the case in both Brazil and the United States?
Answers to these questions can be pursued by examining
the procedural questions the Government most often raises in
court. The arguments are mainly based on the juxtaposition
of individual disputes involving the right to healthcare protec-
tion, on the one hand, and the duties of the general public, on
the other. In the same vein, it will be helpful to examine the
basic principles of jurisdiction of the courts over administra-
tive authorities, which, in the healthcare cases, should also be
guided by the concept of effective judicial protection.
Should  the  Judiciary  get  involved  in  making
Government  health  policy?
As one example of the abundant Brazilian case law on the sub-
ject, it is worth mentioning the case of a patient with physical
impairments who asked to be supplied an orthotic device nec-
essary for the treatment of a post-polio syndrome. The Public
Healthcare Authority, in one of its defenses, alleged that there
was no obligation to supply a medical device not included in a
standardized list in ofﬁcial programs. Their argument was as
follows:
The Judiciary, hearing a request for medication, implies an
infringement of Art. 2 of the Constitution (“The Legislative,
the Executive, and the Judicial, independent and harmo-
nious among themselves, are the powers of the Union”) to
the extent that it (the Judiciary) would be exercising a func-
tion speciﬁcally designated to the Executive, by redirecting
resources from the speciﬁc public policies in existence to an
individual case, regardless of the seriousness of the case.12
Still, the court decided that:
since healthcare is a social right, it should be taken care
of by the state, through public policies, especially the SUS
(Single Healthcare System). According to the Constitution of
1988, such public policies constitute a set of governmental
actions. It is therefore a right of an eminently constitutional
nature, whose obligatory provider (of the right) must be the
state, which has the duty of developing the necessary pro-
grams so that, together, the three public entities (branches of
debates primarily concern the interference of the Judiciary Branch
in  the sphere of the other Branches.”).
h Noting “in Germany, there has been a discussion since 2004
about the possibility of uniting the jurisdictions of public law, i.e.,
combining the special ﬁnancial, social and administrative juris-
dictions into a single jurisdiction of public law. Rather than being
motivated by problems inherent in the nature of the jurisdiction,
however, such efforts at reform through uniﬁcation are based on
pragmatic considerations in order to solve the problem of the sat-
uration of judges in one jurisdiction and enable their transfer to
another jurisdiction”.
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government) will achieve the higher purpose, which is giving
effect to that right. Thus, for the primary purpose of ensur-
ing the effectiveness of that right, the Federal Constitution
distributes to the (Brazilian) Union, the States, the Federal
District and Municipalities the responsibility for such actions
and services.12
In another request to be supplied a portable insulin pump
nd all the accessories necessary for its use, the administra-
ive authorities once again argued that the request offended
he principle of the separation of powers, alleging that “it
s the Executive that has the authority to delineate public
olicies and deﬁne which medications will be supplied gratu-
tously to the public, by weighing the rights of the individual
gainst those of the rest of the community, given the need
o comply with the principle that the individual must not
emand the impossible of the state.”12 Nevertheless, more
han once, the court has decided in the patient’s favor:
a democratic state governed by the Rule of Law inherently
offers the possibility of judicial review of administrative acts;
the Federal Supreme Court itself has increasingly recognized
the possibility of judicial questioning of the State’s refusal to
supply various pharmaceuticals listed in the Clinical Proto-
cols of the SUS, for the treatment of certain illnesses.13
The role of the Judiciary in determining that public policies
stablished by administrative and infra-legal measures need
o be edited or revised must be tempered by the principles
hat guide judicial protection of citizens against administra-
ive authorities.14–16,i To this end, the Euro-American Codejtipulates that the scope and intensity of judicial supervision
hould be as follows:
i Noting, in regards to German law, “according to the case law
f  the Federal Administrative Supreme Court, an ill-deﬁned con-
ept of law is fully reviewable and only in special cases does the
ublic Authority have the last word in decision-making in con-
gurations involving a margin of discretion. For the purpose of
eviewing examination decisions (in schools, universities, etc.) the
ederal Constitutional Court has further expanded the subject-
atter jurisdiction of the courts, declaring that the supervision of
rbitrary rulings by the Public Authority must be supplemented
y  supervision of the ‘justiﬁability’ of administrative decisions.
nother category of cases in which the Public Authority has a mar-
in of discretion involves administrative decisions of a predictive
ature, in case of a risk to the public, or planning decisions, espe-
ially in environmental law, genetic engineering and economic
aw  with respect to the Nuclear Power Plant Construction Act. The
asic idea here is that it is necessary to comply with the special
esponsibility of the executive authorities when it comes to eval-
ating risks. That argument is contradictory, at the very least, for
he  simple reason that, just as the Public Authority, the administra-
ive  courts may consult experts. However, even in cases involving
 margin of discretion, the courts are acknowledged to have the
uthority to supervise the Public Authority’s decisions. Against
hat backdrop, orienting itself according to Art. 114 of the Code
f  Administrative Justice, the court examines whether the Public
uthority of civil service career candidates”.
j An academic text without binding force that was approved in
he  3rd Seminar held in September 2010 in Fluminense Federal
niversity, Niterói, Brazil. 0 1 4;3 2(2):134–143 137
The mission of the Judiciary in the administrative jurisdic-
tion is to uphold the Rule of Law, supervise the legality of
administrative proceedings, and to protect and enforce rights
and legitimate interests.
To this end, the administrative jurisdiction rules on the
following claims, in particular: (a) the annulment of
administrative acts or norms; (b) mandatory and pro-
hibitory injunctions, including enacting administrative acts
or norms; (c) orders to hand over a certain thing.
The Judiciary must examine the legality of the administrative
authority’s acts or omissions. Review of legality encompasses
errors of jurisdiction, procedure and form (formal or external
legality) as well as errors of content (substantive or inter-
nal legality). Review of content refers to examining the legal
grounds of the individual act [questions of law], factual deter-
minations [questions of fact], and legal classiﬁcation of the
events [mixed questions of law and fact]. [The court also]
veriﬁes whether the administrative authority has abused its
power. Even when the administrative authority has applied
ill-deﬁned legal concepts, the court may examine whether
they have been correctly interpreted and applied.
Regarding the review of discretionary powers, it is the duty
of the Judiciary to examine in particular: (a) whether the
administrative authority’s act or omission exceeded the lim-
its of its discretionary powers; (b) whether the proceedings
were suited to the purpose established in the regu-
lation granting the powers; (c) whether there were actu-
ally infringements of fundamental rights or principles, such
as equality, proportionality, good faith, protection of legiti-
mate expectations, and prohibition of arbitrary action. The
Judiciary also reviews the failure to exercise a discretionary
power.k
The above-cited stipulations would be no different if the
content of the disputed administrative acts relate to public
healthcare. This is true except with respect to the technical
aspects that might require the Judiciary to have special qua-
liﬁcations to ensure the quality of the judicial supervision, as
will be mentioned below.
Thus, the Judiciary does not go beyond its institutional
functions to ensure effectiveness of the right to healthcare
when it exercises judicial review over healthcare policies,
because the right to healthcare is a fundamental right in
Brazilian case law.17 For this reason, the Judiciary involves
itself in the healthcare policies otherwise subject to admin-
istrative acts and standards. That power of judicial review
is not limited to repairing the harm caused by an erroneous
k Text prepared in three Euro-American research seminars
“Model Administrative Jurisdiction Code”, held by the Research
Group “Effectiveness of Jurisdiction” in Fluminense Federal
University, Niterói (Brazil), and at the German University of Admin-
istrative Sciences, Speyer (Germany), between the years 2008 and
2010; approved in the 3rd Seminar held in September 2010 in
Niterói. The authors of the code were Pedro Aberastury, Hermann-
Josef Blanke, Gabriele Bottino, David Capitant, Jesús María Casal,
Diana-Urania Galleta, Ricardo Garcia Macho, Leonardo Greco,
Lorena Ossio, Gilles Pellissier, Ricardo Perlingeiro Mendes da Silva,
and Karl-Peter Sommermann.
b l i c a
of the judge is at risk of becoming secondary or dependent
in that respect.21,o,22,p,23,q Would the judge be the hostage
of the experts? This question generates a certain discomfort
n Law no. 2002-303 of 4 March 2002 (The Kouchner Act) – writ-
ten  on the rights of patients and the quality of the healthcare
system and added provisions to the Public Health Code that cre-
ated  three specialized centers in Paris, Lyon and Marseilles for
criminal law issues in the healthcare sector. In France, there are
other courts specializing in healthcare, such as the inter-regional
courts of social and healthcare pricing – that have jurisdiction over138  r e v p o r t s a ú d e p ú 
policy, but also includes the review of policies and orders to
revise the corresponding administrative acts or rules.18,l
Does  the  Judiciary  have  the  expertise  to
interfere  with  the  healthcare  policymaking?
As already noted, the National Council of Justice (CNJ) Res-
olution no. 107 established the National Judiciary Forum to
monitor and settle healthcare assistance claims. According to
Article 2 of that resolution, one of the objectives of the National
Forum is to “propose concrete normative measures to organize
and structure specialized judicial units.”19 That proposal sup-
ports the need for the courts to promote judge’s visits to the
healthcare units and for judgeship schools to promote courses
and events on that subject.18
In fact, the constant specialization of the courts is an
inherent measure of the quality of judicial performance and
therefore of the principle of effective judicial protection. It is
assumed that the judges are best suited to answer the special-
ized questions repeatedly referred to them, since that enables
them to gain in-depth knowledge and reduce the margin of
error.
The specialization of judicial bodies in the subject area of
healthcare would, however, entail fractionalization of judges
and bodies with jurisdiction solely over public healthcare law.
In Brazil, there are no judicial bodies specializing in health
or public healthcare.m Certain noteworthy examples of spe-
cialized judicial bodies may, however, be found in Europe.
In England, for example, the Mental Health Review Tribunal
makes decision on compulsory detention in mental health
facilities for treatment purposes.20 In France, the law of the
l Deciding “since social rights must not be dependent on the
good will of the administrator, it is of fundamental importance
that the Judiciary act as the supervisor of administrative activities.
It  would be twisted to think that the principle of the separation of
powers, originally conceived for the purpose of guaranteeing fun-
damental rights, might be used to interfere with the assertion of
fundamental social rights [. . .]. The correct interpretation of the
principle of separation of powers in public policies is that the Judi-
ciary’s activities should be limited only when the Public Healthcare
Authority acts within the limits permitted by law”.
m In the capital city of the State of Rio de Janeiro, the Lower Trea-
sury Courts adopted a procedure in which civil servants in the
ﬁeld  of healthcare (who are employed by the Public Authority)
prepare, within the court’s own ofﬁces, a technical report on the
legal actions initiated and submit it immediately to the judges,
who examine the report before performing any judicial acts. That
system reduces the number of disputes by preventing the contin-
uation of existing spurious disputes and discouraging new ones,
because the judge is promptly supported by an ofﬁcial opinion
on  the claim presented. In substance, however, that procedure is
sui  generis and is not comparable with a court that has a panel
of multidisciplinary judges, since the opinions are drafted by the
challenged Public Authority itself. On the one hand, it is intended
to  make up for the lack of a prior hearing of both parties when
granting the precautionary measures “inaudita altera pars”, which
are common in proceedings concerning healthcare; on the other,
it is intended to make up for a gap in the Brazilian legal system
which, failing to distinguish between a prior administrative dis-
pute and a prior administrative complaint, requires the absence
of such measures as a prerequisite for ﬁling a judicial action. . 2 0 1 4;3 2(2):134–143
4th of March, 2002 (Loi Kouchner) and the law of the 9th of
March, 2004 (Loi Perben II) have created certain courts specializ-
ing in public healthcare.n In Germany, it is worth mentioning
the example of the “special healthcare senates” within the
social rights courts, as shown by the Code of Judicial Proce-
dural of Social Law.9
Moreover, the possibility of judicial review of
review of administrative technical questions – also known as
“margin of discretion in technical matters” – in the ﬁeld of
public healthcare is inherent to the right to effective judicial
protection. In addition to the specialized legal aspects of
healthcare law, there is increasing demand for a court with
scientiﬁc and technical expertise in healthcare and healthcare
management in order to decide such cases.
However, in a system such as Brazil’s, in which judges
are necessarily educated in the law, such technical knowl-
edge is derived from court appointed expert opinions. The roledisputes related to reimbursement “by installments” in the daily
prices and the prices of other healthcare, social or socio-medical
public services (L. 6143-4 CSP, which instituted ﬁve competent
courts in France: in Bordeaux, Lyon, Nancy, Nantes and Paris) and
the courts of technical reviews that exercise jurisdiction over mal-
practice, abuses, fraud and other offenses committed by medical
doctors, surgeons, dentists, “midwives”, pharmacists and medi-
cal  assistants when treatment is given or services are provided to
social security beneﬁciaries”.
o Enumerating important, hard-to-solve problems in the use of
scientiﬁc proof, by calling attention to the “judge’s capacity to
actually function as a peritus peritorum (expert among experts) on
occasions on which he is called upon to make direct use of sci-
entiﬁc knowledge when formulating the ﬁnal decision”. He points
out, “Resorting to science as an instrument of rationalization of
the  meta-juridical aspects of the judge’s reasoning therefore opens
numerous possibilities which, although undoubtedly interesting,
nevertheless give rise to a great number of thorny problems con-
cerning both the validity of the scientiﬁc knowledge used in the
trial  and extremely important issues regarding the manner in
which the judge performs his role and works out his evaluations”.
p Stating, “it is hard to see how the judge can refrain from
acknowledging the truth revealed by the expert evidence, because
the  judge does not possess, or is not presumed to possess, the
expert’s knowledge. Therein lies the great risk of expert evi-
dence: it transforms the expert into a judge.” and noting that
“the difﬁculty of understanding and evaluating highly special-
ized knowledge also justiﬁes a certain resistance in Germany and
the United States to judicial review of public policies, which are
relegated to internal problem-solving committees of the Public
Authority itself or of the regulatory agencies, or considered policy
matters to be decided upon by the authorities themselves”.
q Given the difﬁculty of expert evidence the judge is required to
be  more careful in establishing the grounds for his decisions; in
such a way that the judge is not allowed to act as an expert nor
the  expert to act as a judge.
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are traditionally connected with private law – generate great
expectations yet fail to achieve the desired effect in terms of
protecting public rights.33,u
s See Chile Constitutional Court Judgment No. 976-07 of 2008;
Colombia Constitutional Court Judgment no. T-760 of 2008: Buenos
Aires National Supreme Court, Healthcare Law of 2010; Uruguay
Court of Appeals in Civil Matters, 2nd Judicial Rotation, Judg-
ment no. 159/2008; Uruguay Court for Administrative Litigation,
3rd  Judicial Rotation, Action for Amparo (constitutional relief) IUE
2-27081/2009.
t Noting, “the resulting difﬁculties are demonstrated in practice,
especially in the borderline healthcare cases, so that the judicial rer e v p o r t s a ú d e p ú b l 
nd justiﬁes the National Council of Justice’s recommendation
hat courts seek alternative means of raising judge’s level of
edical expertise, through speciﬁc judge training programs,
ncluding, for example, visits to public healthcare establish-
ents and events that bring together judges and healthcare
anagers. 18
The United States presents an interesting response to the
oncern that expert testimony in cases turning on technical
uestions may reduce the trier of fact’s role to a secondary
apacity. In the United States both parties to a proceeding
nd, prepare, and present their own expert testimony. Court-
ppointed experts are possible, but rare.24 The trier of fact,
ften a jury in the United States’ system, makes a determina-
ion based on the trier of fact’s evaluation of the competing
estimony. This approach is based on the idea that there are
ften conﬂicting perspectives on technical questions and that
he trier of fact should be presented with those divergent per-
pectives before making a determination.23 While the trier
f fact, whether a judge or a jury, makes credibility deter-
inations, the issue of admissibility of expert testimony is
 question of law and is determined by the judge pursuant to
ederal Rule of Evidence (FRE) 702.25 FRE 702 states that a court
ay allow an expert to testify when:
(a) the expert’s scientiﬁc, technical, or other specialized
knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evi-
dence or to determine a fact in issue; (b) “the testimony is
based on sufﬁcient facts or data;” (c) The testimony is the
product of reliable principles and methods; and (d) the expert
has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts
of the case.24
As can be seen, the role of the judge in the United States
ith respect to admitting expert testimony under FRE 702 is
road. The requirement of 702(a) is a relevancy requirement,
ut the requirements of 702(b), 702(c), and 702(d) require the
udge to test whether the testimony offered has a reliable
asis.26 Furthermore, this rule also addresses, at least in part,
he concern that exists in Brazil as well as in the United States,
hat the judge’s and trier of fact’s role will crumble in the face
f expert testimony.
An additional question that should be addressed is
hether we should consider courts with a multidisciplinary
omposition of judges. In France, the courts specializing in
ublic healthcare include a medical doctor, a veterinarian
nd, possibly, a pharmacologist, who act as the judge’s per-
anent assistants: they are civil servants, and the medical
octor is a public healthcare inspector who has graduated
rom the École des Hautes Etudes en Santé Publique (Higher Insti-
ute of Public Healthcare) in Rennes.27,r The German example
as aroused quite a bit of interest. In Germany, the social law
udicial system, with lay judges, permits judges with health-
are training to settle disputes of public healthcare law.9 The
reat advantage is that, since they are actual judges rather
han mere  expert assistants (assistant civil servants), these
gents’ actions have greater legitimacy thanks to the guaran-
eed effective independence of judges.
r Formerly called L’École Nationale de Santé Publique. 0 1 4;3 2(2):134–143 139
Can  the  Judiciary  protect  an  individual’s  public
healthcare  rights  without  considering  other
individuals  in  the  same  situation?
The existence of thousands of “healthcare law”  cases indicates
the extent to which we are faced with questions of public
interest that demand suitable judicial measures.28 In fact, if
we look at the main causes of such disputes, we  ﬁnd a single
public healthcare authority’s action is repeatedly challenged
because of its widespread effect.4,s This raises the question
whether current procedural instruments in Brazil relating to
class actions are up to the task of handling questions of public
law that affect public interests.29
The Judiciary should follow the principle of equality before
the law, ensuring equal treatment for everyone under its juris-
diction who is in the same factual situation. This principle
justiﬁes procedural instruments such as class actions, binding
judicial precedents and model proceedings (Musterverfahren)
that guide courts in resolving similar cases. Additionally, these
procedural instruments also serve the goals of ensuring broad
access to justice and reducing repetitive judicial proceedings.
However, in a public law case involving an administrative
authority’s acts or behavior, equal treatment before the law by
the Judiciary is a natural consequence of the duty of equality.
This duty of equality has always been binding on Government
Agencies in their substantive duties and in the extrajudicial
sphere.30,31
It is unacceptable to impose duties on administrative
authorities, which beneﬁt individual claimants, without
proper regard to the needs of society as a whole. There is no
logical reason why an administrative act originally intended
for society as a whole should beneﬁt only litigants. Besides
fragmenting and undermining the healthcare system, this
mechanism involves the risk of excluding minorities who  do
not have access to the justice system, departing from the idea
of a universal and egalitarian healthcare system.32,t
Such questions should have one-time erga omnes deci-
sions. The solution should not reside solely in the system
of class actions. Brazil has no solid basis for a speciﬁc judi-
cial procedure compatible with the unique nature of public
law in relation to private law cases. Class actions – whichsolution of such questions, even when attained, still has dubious,
even perverse side effect, in that it safeguards the law solely for
those who can afford access to the Judiciary”.
u Discussing collective actions, which should be brought by those
who are suitably representative, have recently featured the opt
in/opt out mechanism typical of class actions. That mechanism
b l i c a
feasibility requirement (Vorbehalt des Möglichen).  However
besides the fact that the non-availability of funds to meet
the initial claim has not been speciﬁcally demonstrated, it is
v The feasibility requirement can be likened to the German
Vorbehalt des Möglichen, which the German Constitutional Court
has  generally interpreted as meaning that the judiciary can only
impose a duty on the state to provide services that citizens could
reasonably  expect of the state.
w This is one of the provisions of the Euro-American Model
Administrative Jurisdiction Code prepared by legal scholars asso-
ciated with Fluminense Federal University and the University
of Administrative Sciences of Speyer, Germany. It also coin-
cides in part with the text currently under discussion at the140  r e v p o r t s a ú d e p ú 
With these considerations we will venture to make a few
suggestions de lege lata and de lege ferenda to improve the Brazil-
ian judicial system concerning litigation of public healthcare
disputes. We  shall again use the example of a request for med-
ication from the SUS.
The Federal Supreme Court has pointed out that:
the Judiciary, whose vocation is to specify a just solution
for a speciﬁc case (microjustice), is often not in a position
to examine a certain claim for a social right, to analyze the
overall consequences of the allocation of public resources to
the beneﬁt of one party to the invariable detriment of the
whole.34
Along the same lines, some scholars wish to exclude from
individualized juridical proceedings, claims for new medi-
cation not included in the ofﬁcial lists on the grounds that
such cases are essentially collective in nature and should be
decided as such.
However, there is no clear way to deprive the citizen of
the right to call upon the state to provide judicial services to
satisfy a public right. Equally improper would be condition-
ing such services on decisions in class actions initiated by
third parties. To deprive the citizen of access to justice and
conditioning the recognition of rights upon third-party initi-
ated class actions would contradict to the principle of effective
judicial protection and of the Rule of Law.
In fact, upholding an individual’s request for the SUS to
supply the claimant with new medication can imply judicial
recognition that the list of medicines should be modiﬁed. Such
recognition is undoubtedly of general public interest. Assum-
ing that the Judiciary considers it necessary to include the
medication in the list, the natural tendency would be for the
SUS not just to supply the medicine to the claimant, but to
voluntarily promote modiﬁcation of the list and make the
medication available to everyone in the same situation. Such
a measure would be an indirect consequence of the judicial
decision. To do so, however, the socioeconomic impact and
public interest of that measure would have to be exhaustively
discussed in advance in the judicial proceedings. The need for
prior exhaustive discussion is based on the fact that it is unac-
ceptable for a judge, when delivering a judgment, to ignore the
indirect effects of his decision on other patients.
Similarly, in a lawsuit in which it was argued that the
medicines Pegylated Alpha-2a or Alpha-2b Interferon and Riba-
virin were necessary for the treatment of chronic hepatitis C,
one of the judges of the Superior Court of Justice found that
allows a group to be included in or excluded from the class action).
Yet how is it possible for a certain citizen or group of citizens
to be excluded from the scope of a judicial decision which, for
example, orders the Administrative Authority to grant beneﬁts?
Besides that, how can we reconcile individual actions with col-
lective actions, in issues affecting the Public Authority which,
by  reason of their unity, should be decided all at once? Would
conﬂicting decisions on issues arising from the same behavior
threaten the structure of the Public Healthcare Authority? How
is  it possible to judicially restrict administrative behaviors that
are regional or national in scope, whose effects transcend those
territorial limits? . 2 0 1 4;3 2(2):134–143
“according to the principles of democracy, equal treatment
before the law, and the feasibility requirement (Vorbehalt des
Möglichen), it is not a duty of the state to provide an individual
service if it could not be viably provided under equal condi-
tions to all the other individuals in the same situation”.35,36,v
However, the ideal solution would require enacting a new
law in Brazil. The better solution would be to consider the basis
of the individual claims as grounds to suspend considerations
of the merits of the individual claim and to combine the claim
with other like claims in an action brought by an indepen-
dent public body. Such review would fall within the exclusive
jurisdiction of a single court capable of issuing a decision with
erga omnes effects, so long as the original case is suspended
for a reasonable time, without prejudice to granting requests
for urgent measures.w
What  is  the  relevance  of  ﬁnite  resources  to  the
court’s  role  in  resolving  access  to  healthcare
cases?
In an individual claim to be supplied the medicine Clexane
40 mg free of charge, within 30 days after childbirth, the Public
Healthcare Authority argued that budgetary constraints pre-
cluded relief in this claim, since the Public Health Authority
had limited economic-ﬁnancial capacity. It is said that public
entities work with scarce resources and have duties to meet
the needs of the entire population. The court – in accordance
with the predominant case law accepted:
the generic assertion of budget limitations related to theIbero-American Procedural Law Institute, which appointed a spe-
cial committee to prepare a Model Administrative Jurisdiction
Code, presided over by Ada Pellegrini Grinover. Instituto Ibero-
Americano de Direito Processual. Código Modelo de Processos
Administrativos – Judicial e Extrajudicial – para Ibero-América.
Buenos Aires: IIDP; 2012 Aproved by the General Assembly of the
Ibero-American Institute of Procedural Law on XXIII Session of
Ibero-Americanas de Direito Processual, that occurred in Buenos
Aires, on June 8, 2012. The Project was concluded in Febru-
ary of 2012 by the Revising Committee, which is made up
by  professors Ada Pellegrini Grinover, Brazil (President; Ricardo
Perlingeiro, Brazil (Secretary-General); Abel Zamorano, Panama;
Adriáns Simons, Peru; Angel Landoni Sosa, Uruguay; Carlos
Manuel Ferreira da Silva, Portugal; Euripides Cuevas, Colombia;
Gumesindo García Morelos, Mexico; Ignacio M. Soba Bracesco,
Uruguai; Juan Antonio Robles Garzón, Spain; Maria Rosa Gutiér-
rez Sanz, Spain; Odete Medauar, Brazil; Ruth Stella Correa Palacio,
Colombia; Sergio Artavia Barrantes, Costa Rica.
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1. The judicialization of healthcare policy is no exception
to the three-branch system of government since it is
the duty of the Judiciary to protect rights by exercisingr e v p o r t s a ú d e p ú b l 
not sufﬁcient to prevent the realization of the constitutional
right under review, especially in light of the well-known fact
that the Government has abundant allocations earmarked
for far less important interests than the health of the pop-
ulation (for example, advertising, special events), which can
and should be redirected, when necessary, to satisfy the pop-
ulation’s basic rights.36
Moreover, it was afﬁrmed that:
it is not an undue interference by the Judiciary in the sphere
of action reserved to the other branches (of government) but
on the contrary, positive judicial action to provide services
based on the relevant constitutional grounds and on the ille-
gal omission of the administrative authority in attending to
it; especially when that authority, in concrete terms, did not
present any grounds that prevented its accomplishment in
the least.37
In fact, the lack of budgetary allocation could never inter-
ere with the judicial recognition of rights to public healthcare,
r even with the enforcement of sentences against the Pub-
ic Healthcare Authority. The public budget is an essentially
olitical instrument that depends on the law. Social rights,
ncluding the right to healthcare, ﬂow from the Constitution or
peciﬁc legislation. An administrative authority cannot deny
he social rights established by the Constitution and legisla-
ion because of budgetary constraints. Both legislation and the
onstitution charges the administrative authority with guar-
nteeing these rights and it would be contrary to the Rule
f Law if judicial recognition of rights could be imagined to
epend on the political intent of the Legislative or Executive
ranches when drawing up the budget.
Consideration should, however, be made when ensur-
ng effective enforcement of urgent court orders of the
imited human, material or ﬁnancial resources available
o the public healthcare authority. This includes resource
imitations such as: the lack of professional specialists, hos-
ital beds, equipment for treatments and examinations, etc.
uch considerations are permissible when ensuring effective
nforcement of urgent court orders because, in general, the
udicial realization of the claimants’ rights must not affect
he goods or services available to ensure the continuity of an
ssential public service. Therefore, it is necessary to seek a
alance between public and private interests.
This idea that budgetary constraints do not excuse non-
ompliance with constitutionally guaranteed rights is also
revalent in the United States. In Goldberg v. Kelly the United
tates Supreme Court considered whether an individual’s
elfare beneﬁts could be terminated without an evidentiary
earing.38 The welfare authority cited the excessive costs of
roviding evidentiary hearings as the reason for not conduct-
ng a pre-termination hearing.39 The Supreme Court ruled that
[w]hile the problem of additional expense must be kept in
ind, it does not justify denying a hearing meeting the ordi-
ary standards of due process.”40 The approach in Goldberg
n which a constitutional guarantee to due process could not
e overcome for budgetary reasons, matches the approach
dopted in Brazil in which the constitutional guarantee to
ealthcare could not be overcome by budgetary constraints. 0 1 4;3 2(2):134–143 141
A central difference is that in the United States there is no
constitutional guarantee to healthcare as there is in Brazil.
While the idea that budgetary constraints do not excuse
non-recognition of constitutional rights may be obvious, there
are diverging approaches on the manner in which rights are
recognized. This is signiﬁcant because diverging approaches
to recognition of rights can lead to different outlooks on
budgetary constraints. Christopher Newdick compares the
individual-centric and the community-centric approaches to
rights recognition.41
Under the individual-centric approach, rights are vested in
the person and may be asserted just as any other right that
belongs to an individual. In the community-centric approach,
on the other hand, rights belong to society and the recogni-
tion of a right in any individual case depends on the effect
of recognition on society as a whole.42 Since rights belong
to society in the community-centric approach, judicial pro-
tection should be afforded to guarantee that all members of
society have equal opportunity to beneﬁts.42 This emphasis
leads to greater weight being given to judicial protection of
procedural rights.42 Under the individual-centric approach,
however, judicial protection is designed to guarantee “that
which is properly mine.”42 This emphasis leads to greater
weight being given to judicial protection of substantive indi-
vidual rights.
Brazilian courts, as well as the European Court of Justice
(ECJ), adopt the individual-centric approach and offers judi-
cial protection of substantive individual rights.41 It is clear in
a jurisdiction that offers judicial protection for individual sub-
stantive rights that budget restriction cannot justify denying
a right that belongs to the individual. This is the situation in
Brazil and in the ECJ jurisdiction. It is equally clear that a juris-
diction that takes a community-centric approach and provides
judicial protection of procedural rights must take into account
the effect that recognition of a right in an individual case has
on the budget since the right belongs to society as whole.41,x
In the procedural sphere, however, the speciﬁcity of the
topic comes from the fact that public healthcare claims are
predominantly asserted through urgent judicial measures
(such as claims for injunctive relief). In urgent judicial meas-
ures, judicial recognition of a substantive right and protection
of that right coincide in time. This is so that the weighing
of public versus private interests is one more  prerequisite
for granting the measure. Additional conditions precedents
include the requirements of fumus boni iuris and periculum in
mora.
Final  considerations
In sum:x Stating that “[w]ithin the constraints imposed by ﬁnite budg-
ets, a policy to promote substantive, individual rights is likely to
under-estimate the costs of diverting resources from one group of
patients to another”.
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complete jurisdiction over the Public Healthcare Author-
ity. This includes reviewing its discretionary functions and
scientiﬁc content.
2. The shortage of public funding is not an obstacle to judicial
recognition of public healthcare rights, despite material
impossibility of enforcing the decision being considered a
legitimate excuse on the part of the administrative author-
ity. Given the lack of public resources, especially human
and material resources, the courts must weigh public
versus private interests before granting urgent measures
concerning healthcare law.
3. The creation of specialized courts might be considered, per-
haps even with a multidisciplinary panel of judges bringing
together healthcare professionals in order to ensure high-
quality judicial services, particularly when it comes to
administrative questions of a scientiﬁc nature.
4. The Brazilian class action system is neither adequate nor
effective in protecting public rights and consequently pub-
lic healthcare rights. The healthcare law cases – if based on
public policies – should provide single decisions of general
applicability, in order to prevent the Judiciary from serving
as a tool to circumvent the administrative authority’s duty
to follow the principle of equal treatment before the law.
5. A single specialized judicial body composed of multidisci-
plinary members may help safeguard the principle of equal
treatment before the law while at the same time reducing
the number of repetitive trials and improving the quality
of judicial services in public healthcare matters. Such a
body would be situated on the federal or State levels. The
specialized body would decide on federal, State or munic-
ipal healthcare policies, even when individual claims only
incidentally imply healthcare policy questions.
Finally, it should be noted that, except for the suggested
specialization of certain judicial bodies in the healthcare ﬁeld,
the remaining conclusions show that the “judicialization of
healthcare policy” and the judicial protection of public health-
care rights may be carried out efﬁciently in accordance with
the fundamental principles of jurisdictional action vis-à-vis
the public health authorities, without requiring any special
rules of procedure.
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